Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Volume 50
Number 3 Symposium & Developments in the
Law

Article 8

2017

Egg Donation: Whether a Woman Has a Property Right in Her Own
Egg and How Donors Should Be Taxed
Richard Gano
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr
Part of the Contracts Commons, Other Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard Gano, Egg Donation: Whether a Woman Has a Property Right in Her Own Egg and How Donors
Should Be Taxed, 50 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 523 (2017).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School.
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

Egg Donation: Whether a Woman Has a Property Right in Her Own Egg and How
Donors Should Be Taxed
Cover Page Footnote
J.D./Tax LLM Candidate, May 2018, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I would like to thank Professor Ellen
Aprill for her continuous edits and mentorship, not only in making sure this Comment was publishable but
also in all things related to my career. I would also like to specifically thank my Note and Comment Editor,
Michaela Goldstein, for going well above and beyond her duties in helping me get published. Lastly, I
would like to thank the entire staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for making this opportunity
possible.

This article is available in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol50/iss3/8

50.3 GANO (DO NOT DELETE)

10/23/2018 4:21 PM

EGG DONATION: WHETHER A WOMAN HAS
A PROPERTY RIGHT IN HER OWN EGG AND
HOW DONORS SHOULD BE TAXED
Richard Gano*
I. INTRODUCTION
To many, the idea that a woman has a property right in her own
body seems obvious. While courts have granted individuals a property
right in their own blood, breast milk, and sperm,1 the issue of whether
a woman has a property right in her own eggs is still undecided.2 This
lack of clarity leaves many tax scholars and egg donors alike asking
whether the payment received for egg donation should be taxable
income.3 Neither the Tax Court nor the IRS has addressed whether the
payment should be taxable as income or, due to the trauma the
woman’s body endures, “damages,” and therefore excludible.4 The
question remains: how would the tax court analyze such a case?
A thriving market has formed in the United States around fertility,
especially egg donation.5 Although not every jurisdiction allows for
payments in exchange for an egg donation, brokers and donors can be

* J.D./Tax LLM Candidate, May 2018, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I would like to
thank Professor Ellen Aprill for her continuous edits and mentorship, not only in making sure this
Comment was publishable but also in all things related to my career. I would also like to specifically
thank my Note and Comment Editor, Michaela Goldstein, for going well above and beyond her
duties in helping me get published. Lastly, I would like to thank the entire staff of the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review for making this opportunity possible.
1. Blood: see United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1979); Sperm: see Hecht v.
Superior Court, 20 Cal Rptr. 2d 275, 279 (1993). Breast Milk: Bridget J. Crawford, Our Bodies,
Our (tax) Selves, 31 VA. TAX. REV. 695, 719–20 (2012).
2. See Tony Nitti, The Top Ten Tax Cases (And Rulings) Of 2015: #10-Cash For Egg
Donation
Is
Taxable
Income,
FORBES
(Oct.
26,
2015
1:35
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2015/10/26/the-top-ten-tax-cases-and-rulings-of-201510-cash-for-egg-donation-is-taxable-income/#27cebb792d9f (stating egg donation has “led to a
rather big tax conundrum: do the amounts received by the donor in exchange for her eggs constitute
taxable income?”).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Lisa C. Ikemoto, Eggs as Capital: Human Egg Procurement in the Fertility Industry and
the Stem Cell Research Enterprise, 34 J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOC’Y 763, 770 (2009).
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paid anywhere from “$3,000 to tens of thousands of dollars per
cycle.”6 Even though the donor is being compensated for her
“service,” she is called an egg donor.7
From a health perspective the donation process is intrusive.8 The
side effects can be severe: depression, short-term memory issues,
insomnia, bleeding, weight gain, and sometimes even death.9 The
donor must be constantly monitored, and the ultimate long term effects
on the human body are still unknown.10 There is little dispute that the
process is incredibly painful and damaging to the donor.11 Because of
the traumatic bodily experience the woman endures, some previous
egg donors believe that some, if not all, of the payments received
should be non-taxable.12
II. TAX LAW: EGG DONATION AS INCOME OR DAMAGES
Although an egg donor may feel the trauma her body has endured
entitles her to non-taxable “damages,” the tax code uses a systematic
way to determine the tax consequences of any payment. The Internal
Revenue Code uses a broad definition of gross income.13 Gross
income includes “all income from whatever source derived, including
(but not limited to) . . . [c]ompensation for services.”14 An individual
will be taxed on “undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized,
and over which the taxpayer [has] complete dominion.”15 However,
there are numerous exclusions. One such exclusion is for “the amount
of any damages (other than punitive damages) received (whether by
suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments)
on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.”16 The
Treasury Regulations define damages as “an amount received (other
than workers’ compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit or
6. Id.
7. Id. at 771.
8. Id. at 770.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Perez v. Comm’r, 144 T.C. 51, 52 (2015).
12. See Emily’s Mom, Comment to Donor Egg and Tax Deduction, FERTILE THOUGHTS (May
5, 2005, 10:35 AM), http://www.fertilethoughts.com/forums/donor-issues-egg-and-sperm/317108-donor-egg-tax-deduction.html.
13. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 233 (1992) (stating, “The definition of gross income
under the Internal Revenue Code sweeps broadly.”).
14. I.R.C. § 61 (1954).
15. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
16. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2012); See 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c)(1) (2012).
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action, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of
prosecution.”17
With the advent of the egg donor market, the tax implications of
a payment received by an egg donor are unclear.18 With such a
damaging and intrusive process, some egg donors try to exclude the
payment from income.19 In a recent case, Perez v. Commissioner20, the
Tax Court held that the payment received by egg donor Nichelle Perez
was taxable, barring Perez’s exclusion of the payment as “damages”
under code section 104(a)(2).21 In doing so, the court held that a
lawsuit, or threat of one, is a valid requirement in the Treasury
Regulations under 104(a)(2).22 However, the court failed to clarify
whether a woman has a property right in her eggs and the possible tax
implications.23
This Comment takes the position that the court in Perez correctly
upheld the regulation. However, the court should have instead given
Perez a property right in her eggs and analyzed the subsequent tax
implications. As background, Part III of this Comment reviews the
facts of Perez. Part IV explores the court’s holding in depth. Part V
discusses how the court should have recognized Perez’s property right
in her eggs, and how the court should have analyzed the subsequent
tax implications. Part VI concludes by recommending that a court,
when presented with the issue, clarify whether a woman has a property
right in her eggs.
III. CASE HISTORY
In Perez, the court examined the medical procedures Perez
endured and the contractual language between Perez and the donor
company.24 Both played a key role in the court’s determination that
the payment Perez received was taxable.25 The court focused on two
17. 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c)(1) (2012).
18. See Robert W. Wood, Taxing Egg Donations with the Wisdom of Solomon, TAX NOTES
(July 12, 2015), http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/settlements-and-dispute-resolution/
taxing-egg-donations-wisdom-solomon/2015/07/02/14900991.
19. See FERTILE THOUGHTS, supra note 12.
20. 144 T.C. 51 (2015).
21. Id. at 63.
22. Id. at 58–63. Although the statute itself has the lawsuit requirement, Perez questioned the
regulation’s interpretation. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2012).
23. Perez, 144 T.C. at 56.
24. Id. at 53–56.
25. Id. at 62.
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key points: 1) Perez signed a waiver prior to undergoing the donation
procedures, and; 2) the procedures were within the scope of the
contract.26
A. Factual History
1. Personal Background
In 2009, Nichelle Perez, a 29-year-old woman from Orange
County, California, donated her eggs to a non-profit company called
The Donor Source on two separate occasions.27 The company is one
of thirty egg donation agencies in California, and supervised
approximately 250 egg-donation cycles in 2009 alone.28 Like many
other egg donation companies, The Donor Source conducts an
exhaustive preliminary assessment.29 To pass the initial screening,
donors must be between the ages of 21 and 30, have a relatively clean
medical history, and pass a series of psychological and physical tests.30
Once approved, the donor creates a profile in hopes of being selected
by prospective parents.31 The donor is promised future payment only
if she is selected by prospective parents.32
For Perez, the entire process was very painful.33 Perez started by
taking birth control pills for approximately one month to synchronize
her menstrual cycle with that of the egg recipient.34 Once her cycle
was synchronized with the recipient’s, Perez traveled repeatedly to a
fertility clinic to undergo intrusive physical examinations, pregnancy
tests, invasive ultrasound examinations, and blood draws.35 At home,
she injected herself in the stomach with daily hormones using a oneinch needle, causing bruising and pain.36 She testified that the
injections were “actually very painful . . . it was burning the entire
time you were injecting it.”37 As the retrieval date approached, the
frequency of the injections increased from once a day to three times a
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 60–62.
Id. at 52, 55.
Id. at 52.
See id. at 52–53.
Id.
Id. at 53.
Id.
See id. at 55.
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id. at 54–55.
Id. at 55.
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day.38 Every time she gave herself a new shot “she had to search for a
part of her stomach not already covered in bruises.”39 In a nine-day
period alone, Perez injected herself around 22 times.40 On top of all of
this, the final injection was an “intramuscular injection in the lower
hip that goes through a two-inch needle” and “caused Perez significant
physical pain deep in her muscles as well as extreme abdominal
bloating.”41
On the retrieval date, March 27, 2009, she was required to
undergo anesthesia and was informed of the possible risk of death.42
The doctor penetrated Perez’s ovaries and removed between 15 and
20 eggs, well above the body’s normal production of just one.43 After
the procedure, Perez “felt cramped and bloated; she had mood swings,
headaches, nausea, and fatigue.”44 For this entire process, Perez
received a check for $10,000.45 Perez then went back for a second
round the same year in August, undergoing the same procedures and
signing the same contracts stating that payment was “in consideration
for all of her pain, suffering, time, inconvenience, and efforts”.46 Perez
again received $10,000 for her donation.47
2. Contractual Language
Once a donor is selected by a recipient, The Donor Source has the
donor sign two contracts: one with The Donor Source and one with
the prospective parents.48 The contract signed with the company gives
The Donor Source the ability to terminate the agreement up to the time
the donor begins to receive hormone injections for egg-stimulation.49
Perez signed her first contract in February 2009, which included the
following provision:
Donor Fee: Donor and Intended Parents will agree upon a
Donor Fee for Donor’s time, effort, inconvenience, pain, and
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 56.
Id.
Id. at 53.
Id.
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suffering in donating her eggs. This fee is for Donor’s good
faith and full compliance with the donor egg procedure, not
in exchange for or purchase of eggs and the quantity or
quality of eggs retrieved will not affect the Donor Fee.50
The contract additionally allocated foreseeable risk by specifying
that the donor assumes “all medical risks and agree[s] to hold The
Donor Source harmless from any and all liability for any and all
physical or medical harm to herself . . . .”51 Further, at the moment the
eggs are removed, they immediately become the property of the
intended parents.52
3. Procedural History
The Donor Source sent Perez a Form 1099 for the $20,000 she
was paid for the 2009 tax year.53 Unsure about how to classify the
payments, she consulted other egg donors online.54 She concluded that
the money was not taxable because it compensated her for pain and
suffering under code section 104(a)(2).55 The Commissioner disagreed
and sent Perez a notice of deficiency.56 Perez filed a petition, and the
Tax Court tried the case in California.57
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Statutory Analysis
Since 1918, the Internal Revenue Code has recognized an
exclusion for payments from personal injuries and sickness.58 This
exclusion is most clearly stated in section 104(a)(2), but what exactly
qualifies as “damages” for the exclusion has changed over time.59 The
regulations currently define “damages” as “[an amount] received
(whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic
50. Id. at 54.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 56.
54. Id.
55. Id.; see I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2012).
56. Perez, 144 T.C. at 56.
57. Id.
58. Wood, supra note 18.
59. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2012); 25 Fed. Reg. 11201, 11490 (1960); Wood, supra note 18;
see also 77 Fed. Reg. 3107 (2012); Small Business Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–188,
110 Stat. 1755, 1839 (repealing the exclusion of punitive damages and the exclusion for damages
not attributable to physical injuries or sickness).

50.3 GANO (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

10/23/2018 4:21 PM

EGG DONATION

529

payments) on account of personal injuries or physical sickness.” 60 In
Perez, the petitioner questioned the secretary’s interpretation that
damages require a legal prosecution or the threat of one. Since the
statute does not define damages, the court applied the Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.61 two-prong analysis
of regulatory interpretations.62
1. Chevron Step One: Congress Has Not Spoken Directly on the
Meaning of the Statute
Under the first step of Chevron, a court considers whether
Congress has spoken directly on the meaning of the statute at issue.
Here, Perez argued that Congress did speak directly on the meaning of
“damages” from a textualist perspective.63 Perez argued that the
regulation’s interpretation is invalid because the basic dictionary
meaning of the word “damages” does not require prosecution, the
threat of one, or a settlement agreement.64 Perez also relied on
previous case law policy rationale as a way to determine the plain
meaning of “damages.”65 Courts have recognized the idea that
personal injury recoveries are nontaxable because they represent a
return of capital, making a person “whole.”66 Following the same
logic, because the idea of the payment is to make the person whole, it
should not matter if or when the person voluntarily subjects
themselves to the damage so long as the payment the person receives
is to make them whole. However, the court did not accept Perez’s
argument that Congress spoke directly to the meaning of damages.67
Instead, the court looked to the second step of the Chevron analysis
and examined the legislative history to decide if the secretary’s
interpretation of the statute was arbitrary or capricious.68

60. 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c)(1) (2012).
61. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (asking if Congress has spoken directly on the issue and, if not,
whether the regulation is a reasonable interpretation of Congress’s intent); Mayo Found. for Med.
Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 56 (2011) (stating there is “no reason why our
review of tax regulations should not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same
extent as our review of other regulations).
62. Perez, 144 T.C. at 59.
63. Brief for Petitioner at 28–29, Perez v. Comm’r, 144 T.C. 51 (2015) (No. 9103-12).
64. Id. at 29.
65. Id. at 30.
66. Roosevelt v. Comm’r, 43 T.C. 77, 88 (1964).
67. Perez v. Comm’r, 144 T.C. 51, 59 (2015).
68. Id.
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2. Chevron Step Two: Section 104(a)(2) Is a Reasonable
Interpretation of Congress’s Intent
Under the second step of the Chevron analysis, the court seeks to
determine whether the regulation is a reasonable interpretation of
Congress’s intent.69 Here, the court used the legislative history to
guide its analysis.70 The court pointed to a recent significant change in
the regulation: the fact that it no longer requires the payment to stem
from a legal suit based on “tort-type or tort-type rights action.”71
The first section 104 regulations, enacted in 1960, required that
payments excluded under code section 104(a)(2) be “received through
prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights,
or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such
prosecution.”72 The 1960 requirement remained until the 2009
proposed regulations were implemented in 2012, removing the
requirement that the legal suit be based on “tort or tort type rights.”73
The 2012 regulations responded to the Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Burke74, a case which restricted exclusion under code
section 104(a)(2) by interpreting “tort or tort type rights” to mean
damages from personal injuries only for which a full range of tort-type
remedies were available.75 This tort-type remedy requirement was too
narrow, as it precluded exclusion under “no-fault” statutes that do not
provide traditional tort-type remedies.76 However, the change in the
language of the regulation did not change the precedent that the
taxpayer’s claim or settlement must be after the injuries occur.77
The court therefore kept the requirement that the payment be
received “through prosecution of a legal suit or action, or through a
69. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
70. Perez, 144 T.C. at 59.
71. Id.
72. 25 Fed. Reg. 11201 (1960). See also, Perez, 144 T.C. at 58 (quoting id.).
73. See 74 Fed. Reg. 47152–53 (2009); 77 Fed. Reg. 3107 (2012).
74. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
75. See id. Although code section 104(a)(2) was amended in 1996, partly in reaction to Burke,
the treasury regulations were only amended in 2012. Ronald H. Jensen, When Are Damages Tax
Free: The Elusive Meaning of “Physical Injury,” 10 PITT. TAX REV. 90–93 (2013); 74 Fed. Reg.
47152 (2009).
76. See 74 Fed. Reg. 47152–53 (2009). In fact, in the summary of the comments to the final
2012 regulations, one commentator suggested “that eliminating the tort type rights test would create
confusion about what constitutes a personal injury. The commentator suggested that the regulations
should retain the tort type rights test but clarify that meeting the test does not depend on the nature
of the remedies or the state law characterization of the cause of action.” However, the final
regulations did not adopt this comment. 77 Fed. Reg. 3107 (2012).
77. Perez, 144 T.C. at 60.
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settlement agreement entered into in lieu of prosecution” under the
second step of the Chevron analysis.78 The next question is whether
Perez entered into a “settlement agreement in lieu of prosecution” as
intended by the statute.
B. Contractual Language
From the outset, the court stated that the issue in this case was not
about determining whether human eggs are property but instead
whether the contractual language and posture between Perez and The
Donor Source qualified for the “settlement agreement in lieu of
prosecution” requirement.79 The court ruled the contract did not
qualify as a settlement agreement under the regulation because the
contract Perez signed was a waiver, something done ad hoc, as
opposed to a true settlement agreement which is signed post hoc.80 The
court cited previous cases which also held compensation for advance
waivers of possible future damages as taxable, and reiterated that the
interpretation “reads most naturally . . . in terms of payment for
injuries sustained prior to a suit or settlement agreement.”81 Further,
the court acknowledged that although Perez had an interest in her
personal rights, because the procedures were within the scope of
which she consented, those rights were not violated.82 Because her
rights were not violated, the pain and suffering was not the same kind
of pain and suffering considered by code section 104(a)(2).83
The court also explained its holding using two different policy
rationales: one based on the case law’s general underlying rationale
for the statute and one based on the practical implications of deciding
the issue the other way.84 Case law states the underlying rationale for
a section 104(a)(2) payment is to “‘make the taxpayer whole from a
previous loss of personal rights.’”85 When individuals waive their
rights, they do not get the benefit of recovering those rights tax-free.86
Additionally, the practical reason for holding the payment as taxable

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 60.
Id. (citing Starrels v. Comm’r, 35 T.C. 646 (1961), aff’d, 304 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1962)).
Id. at 61.
Id.
See id. at 60–63.
Id. at 60 (quoting Starrels, 35 T.C. 646 (1961)).
Id. at 60.
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is because the alternative would cause widespread abuse and
mischief.87 The court gives an example of how athletes could exploit
an alternative holding:
A professional boxer could argue that some part of the
payments he received for his latest fight is excludable
because they are payments for his bruises, cuts, and
nosebleeds. A hockey player could argue that a portion of his
million-dollar salary is allocable to the chipped teeth he
invariably suffers during his career . . . We don’t doubt that
some portion of the compensation paid all these people
reflects the risk that they will feel pain and suffering, but it’s
a risk of pain and suffering that they agree to before they
begin their work. And that makes it taxable compensation
and not excludable damages.88
Accordingly, after analyzing both the regulation and the contract,
the court concluded that the payment received by Perez was taxable.89
V. ANALYSIS
The court incorrectly analyzed the case as a contractual issue
instead of a property right issue. Although the contract stated the
compensation was not to buy Perez’s individual eggs,90 trial testimony
suggested she had a property interest in her eggs.91 The court should
have given deference to the testimony. The resultant tax consequences
will be shown below.
A. Perez Had a Property Right in Her Eggs
The court in Perez was quick to note that both parties agreed the
payments were not about a sale or transfer of Perez’s eggs (thus not
giving Perez a property interest in her eggs), but were rather for
Perez’s performance of services.92 The court did not take issue with
this because “Perez’s compensation depended on neither the quantity
87. Id. at 63.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 54 (“The Parties acknowledge and agree that the funds provided to the Donor shall
not in any way constitute payment to Donor for her eggs.”).
91. Marie Sapirie & Andrew Velarde, Money From Egg Donation is Taxable Compensation,
Court Holds, TAX NOTES (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.taxnotes.com/imp/9506896 (“[T]he fertility
clinic’s chief operating officer said at trial that the lump sum amount that the egg donor provider
would be paid was subject to reduction if no eggs were retrieved.”).
92. Perez, 144 T.C. at 56.
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nor the quality of eggs retrieved, but solely on how far into the eggretrieval process she went.”93 The court referred to two cases that,
unlike Perez, held the transfer of blood plasma was a transfer of
property.94 In Green, the court held the transfer of blood plasma was
a sale of tangible property rather than the performance of services
because the taxpayer was paid based on quantity.95 In Garber,
although the court did not make a ruling on the issue, the court
indicated the transfer of blood plasma may be a sale of property
because the taxpayer’s compensation was related to the amount of
antibodies in the blood.96
However, some commentators believe the trial court gave too
much deference to the contract at the expense of the trial testimony.97
The trial testimony showed the payments would have been reduced if
no eggs were retrieved, indicating that, similar to Green, the quantity
of eggs Perez produced was part of the consideration.98 This shows the
contract could just as well have been classified as a mixture between
property and services.99 The court, however, decided to give deference
to the contractual language.100 The court should have given more
deference to the trial testimony and, similar to Green, concluded Perez
had a property right in her eggs.
B. Perez’s Tax Consequences: Egg Donation Costs as a Business
Deduction
Taxable income includes income from “gains derived from
dealings in property.”101 So if a human egg is considered property,
when the donor sells it “she will recognize taxable income to the extent
she has ‘gain.’”102 To calculate gain, the statutory framework provides
the appropriate method. Gain is the “excess of the amount realized”
over the “adjusted basis.”103 Adjusted basis is the cost of the item
93. Id. at 57.
94. Id. at 56–57. (citing Green v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1229 (1980) and United States v. Garber,
607 F.2d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1979)).
95. Green, 74 T.C. at 1234.
96. Garber, 607 F.2d at 97. The court did not have to decide the tax issue because the appeal
was for a criminal conviction. Id. at 100.
97. See Sapirie, supra note 91.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Perez, 144 T.C. at 57–58.
101. I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (1954).
102. Crawford, supra note 1, at 736.
103. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1993).
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adjusted for any capital expenditures and depreciation.104 For
example, if a seller sells her property for $6,000, the amount realized
is $6,000.105 The seller’s basis in the property is usually the cost
basis.106 If the same seller originally bought the property she is selling
for $500, then that will be the cost basis.107 When she sells it several
years later for $6,000, she will have a gain of $5,500.108
The main issue when a person “sells” a part of the human body is
how to calculate an appropriate cost basis. The cost basis in selfcreated property is “limited to the cost of the materials used to create
the property.”109 For example, when a painter paints a portrait, the
basis the painter has in that portrait is the cost of the paint and canvas
that can be allocated to that specific portrait.110 When it comes to a
basis in the human body, there is overwhelming agreement in the tax
community that a woman who sells her eggs would have a zero basis
in the eggs unless she is able to allocate specific expenditures for her
eggs (food, medication, etc.), which from an administrative standpoint
is very impractical.111 So it would seem the entire gain would be taxed,
as there would be no basis to subtract from the amount realized.
However, Perez could use Green v. Commissioner to generate offsets
to the gain, namely as business expenses under code section 162.112
In Green, the taxpayer was able to deduct the costs allocable to
income from blood donation as a business expense.113 In order to
qualify for the business deduction, the court found that the taxpayer in
Green was “actively engaged in the continual and regular process of
producing and selling blood plasma to the lab for profit.”114 The court
allowed a deduction for food expenses “beyond that necessary for her
104. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1993); I.R.C. § 1012 (2008); I.R.C. § 1016 (2010).
105. Crawford, supra note 1, at 736–37.
106. Id. at 737.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 1012(a) (2008).
110. Crawford, supra note 1, at 737.
111. Having the costs accumulate over her entire life, even over the time of the surrogacy (e.g.,
the costs of choosing not to smoke) would be too hard to administer and thus would be too
speculative for courts. See Jay A. Soled, The Sale of Donors’ Eggs: A Case Study of Why Congress
Must Modify the Capital Asset Definition, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 919, 948–50 (1999); see also
Lisa Milot, What Are We—Laborers, Factories, or Spare Parts? The Tax Treatment of Transfers
of Human Body Materials, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053, 1104 (2010); Crawford, supra note 1,
at 737.
112. See I.R.C. § 162 (2012).
113. Green v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1229, 1230–32 (1980).
114. Id. at 1235.
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personal needs”115 and the food and vitamins “intimately related to
petitioner’s production of acceptable blood plasma . . . in furtherance
of her business selling blood plasma.”116 The court also allowed her to
deduct the travel expenses to the lab because she was transporting her
“product” to the marketplace.117 The court stated: “The nature of her
product was such that she could not transport it to market without her
accompanying it. Of necessity, she had to accompany the blood
plasma to the lab. Unique to this situation, petitioner was the container
in which her product was transported to market.”118
Here, Perez has a good argument that the frequency at which she
donated her eggs would allow her to allocate and deduct some of the
expenses as business expenses. She not only donated her eggs twice
in 2009, she also donated her eggs in 2008.119 Whether this is
continuous or frequent enough for the court is open for debate.
However, because of how long the entire process takes, and the fact
she did it three times in two years, Perez would have a strong
argument.120 Similar to the taxpayer in Green, Perez could deduct the
travel expenses as well as the food and vitamins directly allocable to
the egg development. However, these costs would only likely
accumulate once she signed the contract with The Donor Source, as
her business relies solely on her qualifying for the contract.121
VI. WHETHER A WOMEN HAS A PROPERTY RIGHT IN HER EGGS IS
STILL UNDECIDED
The issue with classifying reproductive material as property for
tax purposes poses issues that are both ethical and practical. Whereas
courts have tackled the issue of property rights when it comes to
sperm, blood, and breast milk, courts have yet to determine whether a
woman has a property right in her eggs.122 When the next court is
115. Id. at 1236.
116. Id. at 1236 n.12.
117. Id. at 1237–38.
118. Id. at 1238.
119. See Sapirie, supra note 91.
120. See Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d. 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating
that when determining whether something is considered inventory, “[a]lthough frequency and
substantiality of sales are not usually conclusive, they occupy the preeminent ground in our
analysis.”).
121. Having the costs accumulate over her entire life (e.g., the costs of choosing not to smoke)
would be too hard to administer and thus would be too speculative for courts. See Soled, supra note
111, at 948–50.
122. See Crawford, supra note 1.
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presented with this issue, the court should clarify whether a woman
has a property right in her eggs.

